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If I were to say to you, “I love you”, it would be true just in case the author loves the
reader. But imagine we devised a clever way of speaking such that when we preface a
statement with the expression “swap”, the contextual interpretation of speaker and hearer
are switched. Under this supposition, my utterance of “swap: I love you”, would be true
just in case the reader loves the author, i.e. just in case you love me. Are natural languages
populated by linguistic devices such as “swap”? Or are such devices exceptions to the
semantic norms?
In the 1970s, David Kaplan famously bracketed off such devices as linguistic freaks
or what he called semantic monsters (Kaplan 1989a: 510). Roughly speaking, a semantic
monster is an expression which when affixed to a sentence requires that the sentence be
re-interpreted as if it were uttered in a different context. Of course, we can in theory entertain
artificial languages with such operators, but Kaplan claimed that natural language doesn’t
have such means of expression.1 (It is contested whether this is supposed to be a contingent
fact about natural languages or a non-contingent fact grounded in the nature of context
and content.)
In this chapter, I will provide a general overview of the issues surrounding semantic
monsters. In section 1, I will outline the basics of Kaplan’s framework and spell out
how and why the topic of “monsters” arises within that framework. In Section 2, I
will distinguish four notions of a monster that are discussed in the literature, and show
why, although they can pull apart in different frameworks or with different assumptions,
?For comments and discussion thanks to Derek Ball, Eliot Michaelson, Bryan Pickel, Anders Schoubye,
and Wes Holliday.
1Strictly speaking he said this: “I am not saying we could not construct a language with such operators,
just that English is not one. And such operators could not be added to it” (Kaplan 1989a: 510). Although the
claim is in the first case only about English, the modal claim suggests the more general thesis that natural
languages don’t have such operators.
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they all coincide within Kaplan’s framework. In Section 3, I will discuss one notion that
has spun off into the linguistics literature, namely “indexical shift”. In Section 4, I will
emphasize the connection between monsters and the compositionality of asserted content
in Kaplan’s original discussion. Section 5 discusses monsters and the more general idea of
re-interpretation or meaning-shift. Section 6 closes with a brief survey of where monsters
may dwell, and pointers to avenues for future research.
1 Kaplan on monsters
Kaplan was initially interested in the semantics of utterances of sentences such as ‘He is
suspicious’, where the utterance is accompanied by the speaker pointing at something
(Kaplan 1978). Reflection on this case prompts various questions: What does the sentence
mean? What is said by the utterance? What does the pronoun contribute to the truth-
conditions of the utterance? How does the context of utterance determine what is said?
What role does the accompanying pointing play in the semantics?
More generally, Kaplan was interested, not just in demonstratives such as ‘he’, ‘she’
and ‘that’, but in a broader class of expression that he called “indexical” expressions.
What is common to the words or usages in which I am interested is that the
referent is dependent on the context of use and that the meaning of the word
provides a rule which determines the referent in terms of certain aspects of the
context. (Kaplan 1989a: 490)
This included ‘I’, ‘you’, ‘he’, ‘she’, ‘this’, ‘that’, ‘here‘, ‘now’, ‘actual’, among others. Kaplan
put forward two key principles about indexicals:
Principle 1. The referent of an indexical depends on the context of utterance.
Principle 2. Indexicals are directly referential, where a term is directly referential
just in case the contribution it makes to the content of sentences that contains
it is exhausted by its referent (in a context).2
2The intuitive idea of “direct reference” is that the term refers directly without mediation by a Fregean
sense. Importantly, though, the idea is not that nothing mediates the relation between such an expression and
its referent. Note that Kaplan thinks that the relation between an expression like ‘I’ and its referent it mediated
by a (descriptive) rule: find the speaker of the context. The key claim is that whatever mediation there may be is
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Taken together these principles entail that the contribution that an indexical makes to the
content of utterances of sentences that contain it is fixed by the context of utterance. That
is, no matter what operators an indexical is embedded under, or no matter what linguistic
environment it occurs in, the contribution it makes to the content remains its referent in
the context of utterance.3
Principle 1 seems harmless enough: e.g. if you and I each utter ‘I’ we refer to different
people, or if you and I each utter ‘that’ while pointing at different mountains we refer to
different mountains, etc. The referent of an indexical is sensitive to various features of the
context of utterance, and thus the referent of an indexical can vary across different contexts.
Kaplan insists that Principle 2 is also obvious, but it has controversial and contested
corollaries (in fact, one of the corollaries is the prohibition of monsters). Nevertheless here
are some of the obvious sorts of things that Kaplan points to in order to motivate Principle
2—the principle of direct reference.
Consider the following dialogue:
David: I love you
Richard: I love you
David and Richard have each uttered the same sentence and the sentence isn’t ambiguous.
That is, there is a single English sentence “I love you” with a univocal meaning. Yet, it is an
important fact about David and Richard’s communicative exchange that they have each
said different things. If they said the same thing, then there has not been an expression of
mutual love. (Contrast with Richard uttering ‘You love me’.) But there has been such an
exchange, so they said different things. So its not just that the referent of an indexical that
“off the record” with respect to the resulting content. As Kaplan says “The ‘direct’ of ‘direct reference’ means
unmediated by any propositional component, not unmediated simpliciter ” (See Kaplan 1989b: 568-582).
Kaplan is primarily thinking about this in terms of structured propositions, so if a term is directly referential
then propositions expressed by sentences containing the term would “contain” the referents directly instead
of a proxy or mode of presentation. To be neutral between structured and unstructured conceptions of content
I put it in terms of the contribution an indexical makes to the content of sentences that contain it.
3Quotation is acknowledged to be special and set aside as a harmless exception to this general claim.
We can obviously make claims that require evaluating expressions in other contexts by mentioning rather
than using the expression. For example, when we say “In all contexts ‘I am here now’ is true”. Or consider
the operator V, which is such that pV(φ)q is true iff pφq is valid (see Deutsch 1989 on adding an indexical
validity operator to Kaplan’s logic). In the natural language setting there is much discussion of the connection
between monsters and quotation—any alleged monster must be inspected to see whether or not its “sneaking
in a quotation device” (Kaplan 1989a: 511). See, e.g., Maier (2007) and Maier (2016).
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varies across contexts, it’s also the contribution that an indexical makes to the content of
utterances of sentences that contain it.
Furthermore there seems to be an important contrast between indexicals and other
expressions in terms of their contribution to content. In particular, unlike other expressions
such as definite descriptions, the contribution of an indexical never seems affected by a
linguistic embedding. Trump is both the referent of ‘the US president’ and the referent of
the personal pronoun in the mouth of the current US president, but ‘the US president’ and
‘I’ in the mouth of the current president differ in how they contribute to content. Trump is
not always the contribution that ‘the US president’ makes to the content of sentences that
contain it. If it was then both (1) and (2) would be true, but (2) is false (on its most natural
reading).
(1) The US president is Trump
(2) Five years ago, the US president was Trump
Whereas, in line with Principle 2, indexicals seem to contribute their referent even when
embedded under shifty operators. Consider Trump’s utterances of the following:
(3) I am Trump
(4) Five years ago, I was Trump
Indexicals seem to “cling tightly” to the context of utterance, and Kaplan took this
to be a general semantic feature of such expressions. Accordingly, Kaplan insisted that
theorising about indexical languages calls for a distinction between two aspects of mean-
ing. There is what is said by an utterance—its content in a context—but there is also the
semantic rule that encodes what content an expression has across contexts—this is the
character of the expression. A sentence like “I love you” has a univocal character, and this
is the level of meaning that is known by competent language users. This character yields
different contents depending on the context, e.g. depending on who utters it.
Kaplan models this idea in terms of intensional semantics as follows: A sentence is
assigned a character. A character is a function from contexts of utterance to contents. The
content of a sentence is itself a function from possible circumstances to truth-values. Thus,
we get Kaplan’s familiar two-step semantic procedure:
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character
context
content
circumstance
truth-value
Although often conflated there are actually two independent reasons sometimes cited for
Kaplan’s two-step procedure:4
• a motivation stemming from the compositional interaction of intensional operators
and indexicals (i.e. double or multiple indexing)
• a motivation stemming from the notion of assertoric content (“what is said”) and its
broader role in communication.
Let’s consider each in turn.
First double indexing: The motivation from the compositional interaction of inten-
sional operators and indexicals doesn’t actually motivate the character/content distinction
(cf. Lewis 1980).5 Instead it calls for points of reference to be “doubly indexed”, in the
sense that the semantic index must contain two parameters of the same type, e.g. two time
parameters, two world parameters, etc. That a semantics for languages with indexicals
embedded under intensional operators requires double indexing was first pointed out by
Kamp (1971) with regard to tense logic.6 Consider sentences such as this:
(5) Everyone now alive will be dead.
What is required to handle such cases is a time parameter t that ‘now’ is sensitive to and
an additional time parameter t′ that is shifted by ‘will’. Although double-indexing can
handle the problematic cases of indexicals embedded under intensional operators, Kaplan
insisted that “mere double indexing, without a clear conceptual understanding of what
each index stands for, is still not enough to avoid all pitfalls.” (Kaplan 1989a: 510)
4See Stalnaker (2018) for a nice discussion of this point. Cf. Rabern (2012a).
5See Stalnaker (2018), Santorio (2019), and Rabern (2012b: chapter 0).
6The ancestor to the 1971 paper on ‘now’ is Kamp (1967) “The treatment of ‘now’ as a 1-place sentential
operator”, 1967. This is stored in the Prior Archives at the Bodleian Library Oxford (Box 15). A copy is
available here: http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/Tk3ZmEyN/
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The other, more fundamental reason, for Kaplan’s insistence on the two-step procedure
concerns the relationship between semantics and the contents of assertion. Essential to
Kaplan’s two-step picture is a particular view about the division of theoretical labor
between the parameters that make up the semantic index. There’s a context, and there’s
a circumstance. We need both, according to Kaplan, because we need our semantic
theories to be able to capture the two different ways in which, when somebody says
(for example), “I love you”, the truth of their utterance depends on the context in which
they say it—roughly, that the situation in which they say it influences both what was
said, and whether whatever was said is true. Contexts play a content-generating role—
resolving context-dependence in order to determine what’s said—and circumstances play
a content-evaluating role—they’re the things of which what’s said is either true or false.
index = 〈content-generating parameters, content-evaluating parameters〉
In its content-generating role, the context provides all the various contextual parameters
for the resolution of indexicals and other context-sensitive expressions—different people
say different things, depending on who’s speaking and who’s being spoken to, with “I
love you”. In its content-evaluating role, the circumstance provides various parameters
appealed to in the semantics of intensional constructions. For example, in the evaluation of
an utterance of “Necessarily, I love you” the modal operator “Necessarily” checks whether,
in every circumstance, things are as that particular utterance of “I love you” represents
things as being. If there is a circumstance of evaluation differing with respect to whether
things are as the utterance, in context, represents things as being, then the utterance of the
modalized sentence is false (and it’s true otherwise). According to Kaplan the two-step
procedure is crucial, since a central task of a semantic theory is to tell us what sentences
say in various contexts—what propositions or pieces of information do they express in a
given context.7
Kaplan takes the motivations for double indexing to be in harmony with the division of
parameters into content-generating and content-evaluating. Indexicals are sensitive to the
first sort of parameter, while intensional operators shift the second sort. The role of context
is to generate content. The role of circumstance is to be the sort of object that content is
true or false of. When a shifty operator O is applied to a sentence χ the character of χ first
uses the context to generate the content of χ in context, and then the shifty operator looks
7“The idea of Content—the what-is-said on a particular occasion—is central to my account.” (Kaplan 1989:
568)
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at the profile of the content of χ across various circumstances. Given this sort of picture it
could never be that the content of φ in context c is the same as the content of ψ in context
c, while for an operator O, O(φ) and O(ψ) have different contents in context c.8
For example, assume that in context c, Richard says to David “I love you”. In this
case, “I love you” and “Richard loves David” have the same content in c. Now consider
embedding those sentences under the “swap” operator:
(6) swap: I love you
(7) swap: Richard loves David
If the prefix “swap” worked so that the contextual roles of speaker and addressee were
swapped, then (6) would be true in c just in case David loves Richard, while (7) would be
true in c just in case Richard loves David. So (6) and (7) would have different truth-values,
and thus different contents in c, in spite of their embedded sentences (‘I love you’ and
‘Richard loves David’) having the same content in c.
Notice that it follows from this that an operator such as “swap” has to be sensitive to
the character of its embedded sentence, not merely its content. Such as operator doesn’t
work by shifting a content-evaluating parameter, instead it works by shifting a content-
generating parameter—that is, it shifts the context. This situation would destroy the elegant
division of parameters into content-generating and content-evaluating. Most importantly,
such operators would violate Kaplan’s principle 2: since the contribution that ‘I’ makes to
the content of (6) is not the referent of ‘I’ in c (namely, Richard), indexicals would thereby
not be directly referential. For these reasons Kaplan bans such operators from his system:
“My liberality with respect to operators on content. . . does not extend to operators which
attempt to operate on character” (Kaplan 1989a: 510).
In spite of Kaplan’s ban, theorists have pointed to various potentially monstrous
constructions of English. Consider some examples:
(8) Never put off until tomorrow what you can do today. [See Kaplan 1989a, fn. 34]9
8What is assumed by this picture is that content in a context is compositional (cf. Kaplan 1989a: 507). See
§4, for discussion of the connection between compositionality of content and the monster prohibition. See
also Rabern (2012a) and Westerståhl (2012).
9From Lewis Carroll we find a related example: “You couldn’t have it if you did want it,” the Queen
said. “The rule is, jam tomorrow and jam yesterday—but never jam today.” “It must come sometimes to ‘jam
today’,” Alice objected. See Through the Looking-Glass, and What Alice Found There, 1871, Chapter 5.
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(9) Said by a condemned prisoner: I am traditionally allowed to order whatever I like for
my last meal. [See Nunberg 1993: 20]10
(10) Said by an amnesiac who thinks he’s a Scottish philosopher:
I might be Hume [See Santorio 2012 for related examples]
(11) Only I ordered a drink I liked (no one else did). [See Partee 1989, footnote 3]11
Focus on the last example. Assume three people walk into a pub (A, B, and C). They each
order a pint of the local beer. A likes the beer, but B and C don’t. A then says “Only I
ordered a drink I liked”. On one reading he’d be saying “I’m the only x such that x ordered
a drink that I liked”.
(11a) ∀x(x ordered a drink A liked→ x = A)
That reading is false. They all order the local beer, which A liked, so B and C also ordered
a drink that A liked. But, in the situation, the naturally intended reading is “I’m the only
x such that x ordered a drink that x liked”.
(11b) ∀x(x ordered a drink x liked→ x = A)
And this is true, since A liked what he ordered but no one else liked what they ordered.
Importantly, on this reading the second occurrence of ‘I’ in (11) does not refer to the
speaker of the context. It seems that Principle 2 has been violated; it seems that there there
is a monster present. But it depends on how the construction is analysed, and also on
background issues concerning the operative notion of “monster”.
2 Different notions of monsters
Kaplan describes monsters in various ways, sometimes focusing on their formal properties,
sometimes on the sorts of effects they’d have on indexicals, context, or content. There are
at least four notions of a monster found in Kaplan that are discussed in the literature.
10Other examples form Nunberg (1993) include “Tomorrow is always the biggest party night of the year”.
11Also from Oscar Wilde’s poem Easter Day we find the following: “Foxes have holes, and every bird its
nest, I, only I, must wander wearily, And bruise My feet, and drink wine salt with tears”.
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Even though these notions all coincide within Kaplan’s particular framework, they can
pull apart within different frameworks or with different background assumptions.12
Initially the banned operators are glossed as character-operators, i.e. operators that are
sensitive to the character instead of the content of their embedded sentence.
• “. . . operators which attempt to operate on character” (p. 510)
• “Operators. . . which attempt to meddle with character” (p. 511)
Consider ‘swap: I love you’ uttered in context c. The ‘swap’ operator takes the character of
‘I love you’ and evaluates it at c∗, where the speaker and hearer are swapped. Importantly,
to work in the intended way ‘swap’ must operate on character not content—its object must
be the level of meaning that is unsaturated by context.13
A second pass glosses them as context-shifting operators:
• “such operators as ‘In some contexts it is true that’. . . ” (p. 510)
In the example above ‘swap’ shifts the context c to the context c∗. Just as standard inten-
sional operators ”shift” various parameters such as world and time, monstrous operators
shift context parameters.
Monsters are also described as indexical-shifting devices in the sense of operators that
shift the referent of “indexicals” and therefore violate the principle of direct reference.
• “. . . indexicals always take primary scope” (p. 510)
• monsters violate Principle 2 (p. 510)
• “. . . no operator can control the character of the indexicals within its scope” (p. 510)
Given that indexicals are understood as expressions whose content varies with context,
then if monsters shift the context they can thereby shift the content (and thus referent) of
indexicals. In the presence of monsters, the contribution an indexical makes to the content
of sentences that contain it is not exhausted by its referent (in a context). Thus monsters
violate principle 2: the principle of direct reference.
12See Rabern (2012b: chapter 6, “Semantic monsters”), Rabern and Ball (2019), and Yalcin (forthcoming).
13Monstrous constructions are character-compositional but not content-compositional. See Rabern (2012a),
Westerståhl (2012), and McCullagh (2017). In certain frameworks, this is encoded in the compositional rule
called monstrous functional application.
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Finally, monsters are described as devices that would alter the content of their embed-
ded sentence:
• “[an operator], which when prefixed to a sentence yields a truth if and only if in some
context the contained sentence . . . expresses a content that is true in the circumstances
of that context?” (p. 510)
If there was such an operator O, then what a sentence φ contributes to what is said by an
utterance of O(φ) in a context c might not be φ’s content at c. Instead the contribution to
the content of O(φ) in c may be the content of φ in some shifted context c∗. Monsters then
are operators that can shift the contribution that an expression makes to what is said—in
other words, a monster is a shifter of a content-fixing parameter.
Thus we have the following four notions of a monster:
Characterological operator: An operator that operates in the character of its operand.
Context-shifting operator: An operator that shifts a parameter of the context.
Indexical-shifting operator: An operator that shifts the referent of indexicals in its
scope.
Content-shifting operator: An operator that shifts a content-fixing parameter.
Clearly these notions all coincide in Kaplan’s framework given that the key terms are
inter-defined: Character is a function from contexts to contents; a context is a sequence
of content-fixing parameters; and indexicals are expressions whose content (and thus
referent) varies across contexts. So an operator shifts the referent of an indexical in its
scope iff it shifts a parameter of context iff it operates on the character of its operand14 iff
it shifts a content-fixing parameter.15
14Some common assumptions are in the background here. For example, of course one could construe
negation as an operation on character, but we want to say that genuine character operators are the ones that
could only be specified as taking characters as argument. One might also worry about strange character
operators such as Fav, where Fav(φ) is true iff the character of φ is the speaker’s favorite character. On a first
pass this doesn’t look like a context-shifter at all, but with some ingenuity it can fit the mold.
15Predelli (2014) claims that Kaplan fails to “provide a univocal definition of a monster and vacillates
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3 Indexical shift
In connection with the notion of an indexical-shifting operator the phenomenon of “in-
dexical shift” has become a topic of its own in empirical linguistics. The primary focus in
this literature is on variations in the interpretation of certain indexicals embedded under
certain attitude verbs.16 Indexicals are paradigmatically understood as expressions such
as ‘I’, ‘you’, ‘here’, and ‘now’, whose interpretation depends on the context of utterance.
A paradigm case of “indexical shift” would be a case when the first personal pronoun
is embedded under an attitude verb and can be interpreted as referring to the subject of
the attitude verb instead of to the speaker of the context (for early discussion see Anderson
and Keenan 1985, p. 304 and Partee 1989, footnote 2). Consider a case where a man named
Hesen says that he himself is rich, that is he utters the sentence “I am rich”. In English,
if we wished to report what Hesen said we can’t do so by uttering (12), since it can’t be
interpreted as (12b)—it can only be interpreted as (12a).
(12) Hesen said that I am rich.
a. Hesen j said that I (the speakeri) am rich.
b. # Hesen j said that he (himself j) is rich.
But some languages have been reported to differ on this score. That is, in some languages
the counterpart of (12) could be used to report what Hesen said. For example, it has been
claimed that such readings are permissible in the language Zazaki—an Indo-European
language spoken primarily in Eastern Turkey (Anand and Nevins 2004). Consider (13), a
Zazaki counterpart to (12) after transliteration. (Note that ‘εz’ is the personal pronoun.)
between at least three non-equivalent alternatives” (389). See McCullagh (2017) for critique of Predelli’s claim.
The first two notions Predelli discusses—“context shifters” and “global shifters”—fall under the definitions
of a context-shifting operator provided here. Global shifters are just a certain kind of context-shifting operator
that also shifts the circumstance—such operators are monstrous in virtue of their context-shifting aspect. The
third alternative Predelli detects is what he calls “character shifters”. These are operators that change the
character. These are not what I’ve called characterological operators – “character shifters” are something
more extreme, and I don’t see them in Kaplan. But see §5 for discussion.
16It would seem to be an empirical hypothesis that indexical shift can only occur in speech and attitude
reports, but some in this sub-literature seem to take it as definitional that indexical shift could only occur in
speech and attitude reports. For example, I once put forward the example “Only I got a question I understood
(no one else did)” as a clear example of indexical shift, and a linguist present protested that it can’t be such
a case given that there is no attitude verb involved! Of course Kaplan’s concern with monsters was not
restricted to embedding under attitude verbs, cf. his original “In some contexts it is true that I am not tired
now” (Kaplan 1989a: 510). Theorists are of course free to use terminology as they like, as long as they are
explicit about it.
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(13) Hεseni va kε εz dεwletia.
a. Hesen j said that I (the speakeri) am rich.
b. Hesen j said that he (himself j) is rich.
Anand and Nevins maintain that (13) can be read as (13b), and in this case the referent of
the personal pronoun ‘εz’ is shifted (by the attitude verb ‘vano’) from the speaker to the
subject of the report.17 Moreover, this sort of optional shiftability in speech reports applies
to indexical expressions more generally.
All indexical expressions in Zazaki are in principle shiftable. That is, the Zazaki
counterparts to English I, you, here, and yesterday all have the option of shifting
when within the scope of the verb vano (meaning ‘say’). (Anand and Nevins
2004)
This sort of phenomenon of indexical shift has been documented in various language
around the world. Deal says that “the phenomenon has been reported for languages
spanning five continents and at least ten language families” (Deal 2020: 3-4). Just to get
a sense of how widespread this is it includes the following languages: Amharic, Navajo,
Slave, Tamil, Korean, Japanese, Farsi, Zazaki, Nez Perce, Turkish, Uyghur, and many
more. (See Deal 2020, footnote 3, for references.)
There is by now a library full of empirical data concerning indexical shift. This data
doesn’t just involve a list of languages where shifting is observed; there is also detailed
descriptions of the sorts of variation found. For example: which indexicals can be shifted
in a given language, which attitude verbs can induce the shift, whether the shifting is
optional or required, and what constraints are involved (e.g. if one indexical in a given
clause is shifted is every other indexical also shifted, see Anand and Nevins 2004 on Shift
Together). A goal here would be to systematise the wide array of cross-linguistic data and
to then put forward an overarching syntactic/semantic package that best covers the data.
See, e.g. Deal’s new manuscript A theory of indexical shift.
The issue of indexical shift is clearly relevant to the broader discussion of semantic
monsters. But sometimes it is unclear what the theoretical upshot is, given that the
17The are tests that are supposed to rule out the hypothesis that these case involve tacit quotation. See Deal
(2020), sec. 2.1.1; but see Maier (2016) for disagreement.
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relevant frameworks don’t always align with Kaplan’s original framework. For example:
Are the questions being asked under the assumption of a character and content distinction?
Is it assumed that the role of the context parameter is to be a package of content-fixing
parameters? Is it assumed that an indexical is the sort of expression that has different
contents in different contexts? Given that the indexical shift literature makes different
assumptions on these sorts of questions there may be some misalignment between their
claims and Kaplan’s original ban.18
Here is one sort of tangle one can get in here: If monsters are understood as operators
that shift the reference of indexicals or context-sensitive expressions in particular, one
might then think that the definition of a monster is something like this:
Contextual reference shift. For a construction Σφα, which contains a context-sensitive
expression α, Σ is a monster iff Σ semantically shifts parameter z and the extension
of α varies across different values for z.
This seems to line up well with what theorists in the literature say, and is in line with
Kaplan’s discussion. But the definition prompts a further question: what is a context-
sensitive expression? One idea would be the following:19
Type 1 context-sensitivity. α is context-sensitive iff there are contexts c and c′ such thatJαKc,ic , JαKc′,ic′ .
Given this definition, context sensitivity is a matter of extension varying with context. The
definition of contextual reference shift construed along these lines seems to be in accord
with what Schlenker’s calls the Fixity Thesis: The referent of an indexical is fixed solely by
the context, and cannot be affected by any logical operators (Schlenker 2003: 29). To define
the class of “indexicals” Schlenker appeals to a definition in terms of context-dependency:
At this point one might be tempted to plead terminological ambiguity. In what
sense is [an expression] an ‘indexical’ in Kaplan’s sense? Let us use context-
dependency as a Definition: an expression qualifies as indexical if its semantic value
is determined by some feature of a context of utterance. (Schlenker 2003: 31)
18von Stechow (2004) expresses some worries along these lines. The sort of issue presented here mostly
follows Rabern and Ball (2019).
19In what follow I use the bracket notation J.Kc,i to indicate the denotation of an expression at a context c
and index i (cf. Scott 1970). I also use ic for the index of the context, the index that has coordinates that match
the appropriate features of the context (cf. Lewis 1980).
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If by “semantic value” Schlenker means referent then his notion of indexicality is in accord
with type 1 context-sensitivity. But then too many expressions will count as “indexicals” (e.g.
non-rigid expressions such as “the president” or contingent sentences such as “Obama is
a democrat” vary in extension across contexts; cf. Lewis who says “contingency is a kind
of indexicality” (Lewis 1980: 82)). And it is uncontroversial that there are operators that
shift the referent of expressions that are type 1 context-sensitive.20
Context-sensitivity is usually understood to involve more than mere variability of
reference—it is usually understood as a claim about the variability of the content of an
expression across contexts. (So perhaps by “semantic value” Schlenker intends content.)
A more standard definition would go as follows (where |α|c provides the content of α in
context c).21
Type 2 context-sensitivity. α is context-sensitive iff there are contexts c and c′ such that
|α|c , |α|c′ .
This definition is good as far as it goes, but since the definition of contextual reference
shift employs a notion of context sensitivity which appeals to “content”, the definition
must build in certain assumptions about the operative notion of content (see Rabern and
Ball 2019). Are contents supposed to be objects of the attitudes? Or are they just sets of
indices? Is there a character/content distinction?
Those who wish to avoid issues concerning character and content and the definition of
indexicals might just list a certain class of expressions: {I, you, . . . }. Then replace mention
of context-sensitivity in the definition with an appeal to expressions in that class. It seems
that the linguistics literature on indexical shift leans in this direction.
20von Stechow (2004) complains that Schlenker’s (2003) semantics is not actually monstrous since “attitudes
quantify over triples that are composed of the same components as context, but they are not contexts of
utterances but rather indices” (2004: 479-480). On Schlenker’s “monster-friendly” semantics (see Schlenker
2003: 104ff ) the attitude operators never shift the context parameter c. Instead they modify the assignment
function s, and the personal pronoun is essentially treated as a variable that is sensitive to the assignment.
Thus, von Stechow’s complaint is that Schlenker’s semantics shifts indices, and not contexts: “IAmharic” is
sensitive to the index and “says” is an index-shifting operator. Of course, Schlenker’s semantics has operators
that shift the referent of the personal pronoun “IAmharic” (or its analog in the formal system “agent(ci)”), so this
is why Schlenker insists that it is monstrous. But since Schlenker says nothing about how to define assertoric
content in his system it isn’t clear whether the attitude operators in Schlenker’s system merely shift type 1
expressions or whether they also shift type 2 expressions.
21The distinction here between type 1 and type 2 context sensitivity tracks the distinction between nonin-
dexical and indexical context-sensitivity (see MacFarlane 2009). If α is type 1 but not type 2 context-sensitive,
it is nonindexically context-sensitive, if α is type 2 context-sensitive, then it is indexically context-sensitive.
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“Indexical” reference shift. For a construction Σφα, which contains an expression α ∈
{I, you, . . . }, Σ is a monster iff Σ semantically shifts parameter z and the extension of
α varies across different values for z.
But the set {I, you, . . . } is stipulative. Why is it interesting that there are operators that
shift the extension of expressions in that class? We need to be told something about the
expressions in that class in order for the ban on monsters to have any substance. One way
to flesh out the definition is to say that the interesting class of expressions are the ones
whose content varies with context, but this again raises the spectre of content. Another
idea would be to just insist that pronouns are clearly a natural class of context-sensitive
expression. And while third person pronouns are easy to bind there is a subset of the
pronouns (i.e. the first and second person pronouns) that are notable in that they are
difficult to bind in English.22 If in certain languages attitude verbs can easily shift first
and second person pronouns that is certainly interesting and important. While the issues
here lead to various difficulties everyone can at least agree with the following: If there are
cases where a genuine first personal pronoun is being used in a sentence and it doesn’t
refer to the speaker of the context, that would seem to be a “monster”, if anything is.
4 Monsters and content compositionality
In Kaplan’s original discussion the existence of monsters and the compositionality of
content are intimately related. If the language is compositional at the level of content,
then there are no operators that shift content-fixing parameters, and thus there are no
monsters (cf. Rabern 2013 and Westerståhl 2012). Kaplan is explicit that he endorses the
compositionality of content: “The Content of the whole is a function of the Content of the
parts” (Kaplan 1989a: 507).
Monsters are operators that shift the parameters upon which semantic interpretation
depends in a way that alters the assertoric content of their embedded clauses. They
require reinterpretation of their operands, in the the sense that they dissociate the context
of interpretation from the context of utterance: this is the feature that Kaplan found so
objectionable. But this relies on a certain picture of semantic metatheory. On Kaplan’s
picture contents, i.e. sets of circumstances, play two roles: in addition to being “what
is said”, the content of a sentence (in context) also plays the compositional role of being
22Perhaps this is how Santorio (2019) sees things. See also Yalcin (forthcoming).
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the object of shifty operators; contents are constrained depending on the operators of the
language, to be the type of semantic entities that enter into compositional relations with
those operators.
Rabern (2013) argues that the there is an inherent tension in Kaplan’s system stemming
from the semantics of pronoun binding or variable binding (see also Rabern and Ball
2019).23 Briefly: Consider (14) which embeds under a quantifier to form (15).
(14) Hei is mortal.
(15) Every mani is such that hei is mortal.
The Tarskian semantics for quantifiers treats them as an assignment-shifting operator as
follows:24
JEvery mani is such that φKg,w = 1 iff ∀x ∈ man, JφKg[i/x],w = 1
Since the content of (14) in a context c is,
|Hei is mortal|c =
{
w : JHei is mortalKgc,w = 1}
the quantifier, which shifts the assignment, shifts a parameter upon which the content of its
complement depends. The semantic value of “hei is mortal” relevant for the compositional
semantics of (15) is not the proposition it expresses at c, and the content of “hei” at c doesn’t
enter into the content of (15). Thus, quantificational phrases such as “every man”, or the
binders associated with them, are monstrous.
This conclusion relies on the assumption that the assignment of values to variables is a
content-fixing parameter. This is explicitly endorsed by Kaplan (1989a) (see p. 546). Since
for Kaplan the distinction between content-fixing and content-evaluable parameters just
is the distinction between context and circumstance, Kaplan suggests that the assignment
23For related worries see Zimmerman (1991), Dever (2004), and Yli-Vakkuri (2013).
24Of course, standardly the roles of quantification and variable-binding are separated, such that strictly
speaking variable binding is done by a covert abstraction operator, λ (see Lewis 1970b: 45 and Heim and
Kratzer 1998: 186). On this construal (15) is actually composed out of the following constituents: “every man”
+ λ1 + “he1 is mortal”, and λ1 first composes with “he1 is mortal” to provide a predicate meaning to compose
with “every man”. To simplify I treat [every man λ1] as an atom which composes with sentence types. This
doesn’t impact the key point—what we say about the variable-binding operator “every man1 is such that”
can instead be made by focusing on the lambda-binder alone (see Rabern 2013: §4)
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be understood as a parameter of context (see Kaplan 1989b: 591). Those wishing to avoid
the conclusion while retaining Kaplan’s alignment between the objects of assertion with
compositional values could instead abandon direct reference. That is, one could insist that
the assignment is not a content-fixing parameter, so that the contents of assertion are sets
of world-assignment pairs (cf. Zimmermann 2012).
Instead one could follow Lewis (1980) and insist on a distinction between the objects
of assertion and compositional values. Such a framework could have it that some content-
fixing parameters live in the index. And this opens up space for expressions whose content
varies with these shiftable parameters: their content varies across index parameters.25
In such a framework, given that the context is no longer the package of content-fixing
parameters quantifiers are not context-shifting operators but nevertheless come out as
monsters in the sense of a content-shifting operator (see Rabern 2013).
Yet once we respect the distinction between the objects of assertion and compositional
values, and consider the roles they play with our linguistic theories, this feature of language
appears absolutely mundane and expected.26 It is only when one is in the grip of the
Kaplanian picture, where “what is said” has a privileged compositional role, that operators
on character would appear to be exceptions to the semantic norms.
5 Meaning-shifting operators
Monsters are understood to require “reinterpretation” of their embedded clause, and thus
they are sometimes described as meaning-changing operators. For example, Predelli
describes what he calls “character shifters”:
Because character is semantically primitive, the idea of (non-trivial) operators
on character informally provokes a sort of ‘meaning change’, one unobjection-
ably expressible in English only with the appeal of pure quotation. (Predelli
2014: 392)
The devices Predelli has in mind are ones that might change the linguistic meaning of their
complement, e.g. an operator that results in ‘dog’ meaning what ‘cat’ means. Predelli
detects this notion in Kaplan, but when Kaplan talks about “operations on character” he
25See Lewis (1980). Ninan (2010) discusses this under the label “shiftable contextualism”, and Yalcin
(forthcoming) under the label “parametric context-sensitivity”.
26See Lewis (1980), and for further discussion Ninan (2010) and Rabern (2012a).
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seems to just mean a context-shifting operator. Kaplan contrasts an operator on character
with an operator on content. The notion of a “character operator” here is clearly of one that
is sensitive to character and looks at its profile across various contexts—on analogy with a
content operator that takes the intension of its complement and looks at its profile across
circumstances—not an operation that reassigns the complement a different character.27
The notion of a “meaning shifting” operator, however, is interesting and is at least
suggested in connection with diagonal operators of other two-dimensional frameworks
(cf. Stalnaker 1978). Monsters are at least content-shifters and the connection between
monsters and the more extreme “meaning shifters” has certainly been made before (see,
e.g., Israel and Perry 1996). In setting out his prohibition of monsters Kaplan seems
to also ban all hyperintensional operators. Given that he says “all operators that can
be given an English reading are ‘at most’ intensional”, it seems he would have viewed
all object-language hyperintensional devices as exceptions to the semantic norms. But
there are various hyperintensional devices that are not context-shifting devices, such as
quotation, or perhaps attitude reports. When the monster prohibition is understood in
this more general way, a “meaning shifting” operator, would certainly be a violation of
that prohibition.
This accords with the standard view that the expressions of a language are associated
with a fixed linguistic meaning. According to this view, there is long-term meaning
change but the linguistic meaning of a word doesn’t shift as the result of some meaning-
shifting operator. This view, however, makes it difficult to accommodate various linguistic
phenomena.
For example, given that ‘eye doctor’ and ‘optometrist’ are synonymous how can it be
that the following sentences might differ in truth-value?
(16) Rebecca believes that all eye doctors are optometrists.
(17) Rebecca believes that all optometrists are optometrists.
Assuming compositionality it follows that sentences (16) and (17) must always have the
same truth-value.
27Given that Stalnaker’s 1978 propositional concepts track variations in linguistic facts, operators that shift
the Stalnakerian “context” could result in ‘dog’ meaning what ‘cat’ means—it is a contingent fact what words
mean. But Kaplan’s characters are importantly different—they capture the way the content of an expression-
of-English (with its fixed linguistic meaning) varies with context, they are not concerned with the variation
of metalinguistic (or presemantic) facts and the contingent connections between expressions and linguistic
meanings.
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A natural explanation for why Rebecca doesn’t believe that all eye doctors are op-
tometrists is that she has a false belief about the meaning of ‘optometrist’ (or ‘eye doctor’).
If the meaning of ‘optometrist’ could be shifted when it was within the belief context, this
would provide a mechanism by which sentences (16) and (17) could differ in truth-value.
In this way, meaning-shifting operators might provide useful resources for the semantics
of various constructions of epistemic discourse (e.g. indicative conditionals, epistemic
modals, and attitude reports).28
There are already treatments of attitude verbs that treat them as operators that shift the
assignment of values to variables (e.g. Cumming 2008, Ninan 2018, Santorio 2012, Rabern
forthcoming). Shifting the assignment is tantamount to shifting the “interpretation” of the
variables, and thus assignment shifters are a close, though perhaps more innocent, cousin
to meaning-shifting devices.29 Given that these proposals only work for singular terms,
a natural generalisation would be to have epistemic contexts shift the interpretation of
general terms such as ‘eye doctor’ and ‘optometrist’ as well. Here there is likely to be an
interesting convergence of the resulting picture and certain aspects of two-dimensional
semantics (cf. Stalnaker 1978, Chalmers 2004).
Or consider cases of meaning negotiation.30 In a dispute about what should be in the
extension of ‘athlete’ someone who is arguing that it only applies to humans might utter
the following conditional (see Ludlow 2008).
(18) If Secretariat is an athlete, then the greatest athlete of all time was a horse.
The semantics of this conditional most naturally involves evaluation of the consequent
relative to a shifted (or more discerning) interpretation.
There are also cases that concern a more explicit form of meaning shift. These in-
volve constructions of semantic stipulation, where one coins new terms or stipulates new
meanings for old terms.
(19) Let’s call horse appendages legs. Then, how many legs does a horse have?31
28Note that the literature on the ‘logicality of language’ or ‘natural logic’ often makes use of interpretation-
shifting devices in the logical form. These are sometimes called “modulation” functions. See, e.g., Del Pinal
(2017) and Chierchia (manuscript)
29The operators of early modal logic in the style of Carnap were like this. Even the semantics for quan-
tification is sometimes given in terms shifting the interpretation (see Bostock 1997). In this connection see
Wehmeier (2018) and Pickel and Rabern (manuscript).
30See the literature on metalinguistic negotiation, e.g. Plunkett and Sundell (forthcoming).
31See Stalnaker (1978: 317) who says, “If you call a horse’s tail a leg how many legs does a horse have? The
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It might seem reasonable to answer ‘five’ (the lower limbs plus the appendage of ligaments
and long hairs beginning at the coccygeal vertebrae) but if the meaning of ‘leg’ is stable,
then the answer should be ‘four’. These type of stipulations are common in both everyday
conversations and in theoretical writing, e.g. when we introduce names for objects or
concepts.
(20) Let us use ‘Julius’ to refer to whoever invented the zipper.
(21) The function f has two roots—call them ‘r1’ and ‘r2’. (Dever 1998: §2.3.2.4.1.1)
These constructions of semantic stipulation result in a rearrangement of the relations
between words and meanings in the language system, or at least alter the “linguistic
scoreboard”. Shifts of this kind are highly reminiscent of certain commands in imperative
programming languages, where one might have a command like this: Let ‘a’ = 5. The
result would be that the string ‘a’ gets assigned to the value 5. But such an assignment
isn’t permanent, since later within the same program there might be the command: Let
‘a’ = 7. A semantic framework built around the semantics of interpretation-shifting im-
peratives (and “mutable variables”) might provide a systemic account of natural language
constructions of semantic stipulation (and meaning negotiation).32
6 Where monsters dwell
The topic of monsters has reared its head in a wide variety of philosophical and linguistic
debates. In an important sense the issue concerning monsters is at at the very foundations
of semantic theory and has been implicit in many early discussions of semantic metatheory.
In the early tense logical work on the interactions of temporal operators and indexicals
stemming from the work of A.N. Prior, which led to the development of multiply-indexed
semantics, the issue of monsters is just below the surface (see Prior 1968, Kamp 1971, and
answer, of course is four, since calling a tail a leg doesn’t make it one. But one can see a different way to take
the question.”
32All forms of semantic stipulation, however, are not this explicit. There are many forms of implicit
semantic shifts. For example, if some conversational participants don’t remember the name of a certain bike
part, they might spontaneously begin referring to it as the “whatchamacallit”. Here there would be no explicit
stipulation but it is clear that “whatchamacallit” would come to have a meaning in this conversation via the
cooperation of the interlocutors. This points to a dynamic conversational phenomenon of shifts in the lexicon
throughout a discourse, which calls for a logical framework that can model the processes of “on the fly”
meaning shift. For discussion of the dynamic lexicon along these lines see Ludlow (2014).
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Vlach 1973).33 Likewise, when Evans (1985) asks whether tense logic rests on a mistake,
the final theory he considers, T3, is arguably a monstrous semantic theory, and he notices
that it employs what he calls “a hitherto unknown form of embedding”.34
And, of course, Kaplan’s monster prohibition was in part a reaction to the early formu-
lations of semantic theory, and what Kaplan viewed as a misguided attempt to “assimilate
the role of context to that of circumstance” (Kaplan 1989a, p. 509). That is, in so far as a point
of reference was to do the work of a context of utterance it is arguable that the frameworks
developed in Montague (1968), Scott (1970) and Lewis (1970b) were monstrous.
In the intervening literature the issue has come up most explicitly with respect to
the semantics of discourse about thought and speech, especially with respect to reports
of indexical attitudes (e.g. Israel and Perry 1996 and Schlenker 2003), including reports
involving de se attitudes, self-locating belief, or logophoricity (e.g. Castan˜eda 1966, Chier-
chia 1989).35 As mentioned above there has been much discussion in empirical linguistics
of indexicals that can shift when embedded in attitude reports, e.g. some much discussed
examples include Amharic (Schlenker 2003), Zazaki (Anand and Nevins 2004), and Nez
Perce (Deal 2014). For a comprehensive overview see Deal (2020).
In theorizing about mental and epistemic discourse monsters have been employed in
treatments of various puzzles of substitution in opaque contexts (e.g. Recanati 2000 and
Cumming 2008). For similar reasons, linguistic devices that make implicit reference to
attitudes, the common ground or information states, e.g. the semantics of knowledge
claims, epistemic modals and indicative conditionals, have been given a monstrous se-
mantics (e.g. Israel and Perry 1996, Weatherson 2001, and Santorio 2010).36 For example,
consider an epistemic use of “I might not be here now”. And the threat of monsters has
33In fact, Vlach (1973) introduced the “index operator” K, whose function is to fix the context to which
the “then-operator” refers—and this is technically a monstrous operator as it shifts the temporal parameter
that represents the time of utterance. The issue even comes up in connection to disambiguations of Anslem’s
ontological argument (see Lewis 1970a: 185-186)
34Evans compares the situation to the following: “Suppose that there is a language exactly like English, save
that it possesses two additional operators, ‘To the right’, and ‘To the left’, which can be prefixed to sentences
in the first person. A sentence like ‘To the left (I am hot)’ as uttered by a speaker x at t is true iff there is at t
on x’s left someone moderately near who is hot” (Evans 1985 pp. 357-358). The discussion in Evans appears
to be independent of Kaplan’s work but the unknown form of embedding Evans is considering is clearly
monstrous embedding. See also Evans (2004), which is a letter dated 14 July, 1979, written to Martin Davies
in response to a draft of “Two notions of necessity”.
35It is also arguable that the issue is just below the surface in discussions of indexical belief revision and
the semantics of credential attributions in relation to Bayesian probability theory see e.g. Elga (2000) and
Chalmers (2011).
36See also Chalmers (1998) and Nolan (2003).
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also been noted with respect to the semantics of embedded knowledge claims and em-
bedded epistemic modals in the literature on relativistic semantics (e.g. Egan et al. 2005
and Ninan 2010). Monsters are also featured in the semantics of metalinguistic discourse,
including the semantics of quotation, speech reports, talk about fiction, and ascriptions of
indexical validity.37
A key area of the philosophical literature where the topic of monsters (or quasi-
monstrous operators) arose was in theorizing about attributions of apriority with respect
to analyses of the Kripkean contingent apriori and necessary aposteriori (see Stalnaker
1978, Evans 1979, and Davies and Humberstone 1980).38 These two-dimensional analyses
often employ monstrous or quasi-monstrous two-dimensional modal operators. For ex-
ample, Davies and Humberstone’s fixedly operatorF and Stalnaker’s “copy up” operator
† (Davies and Humberstone 1980; Stalnaker 1978).
In this connection various puzzles arise when epistemic and non-epistemic modalities
are combined with indexicals. One such puzzle is Fritz’s nesting puzzle for temporal-
epistemic logics (Fritz 2013: 1768). Assume a multi-modal propositional language with
both temporal and epistemic operators. So the language has standard temporal operators
such as P (“It has at some time been the case that. . . ”), F (“It will at some time be the
case that. . . ”), H (“It has always been the case that. . . ”), and G (“It will always be the
case that. . . ”). But also assume it has N, the indexical “now” operator (Kamp 1971). The
language also has an epistemic operator, K, for “the agent knows that. . . ”. We assume per-
fectly rational agents, so that the agent always knows every validity. Or one might insist
that we are concerned with the implicit knowledge of a rational agent—what is compatible
with the information available to the agent. In any case, we assume the following logical
omniscience principle:
eternal logical omniscience: If  φ, then  GKφ
37For monsters in the semantics of quotation see e.g. Maier (2007), Maier (2016), Cappelen and Lepore
(2003), Geurts and Maier (2005) and Cappelen and Lepore (2007), in speech reports see e.g. Schlenker (2003)
and Anand and Nevins (2004), in talk about fiction see Predelli (2008), and on indexical validity see Deutsch
(1989). A further fundamental topic where monsters arise is with various phenomena whereby the context of
interpretation is dissociated from the context of utterance: the historical present, answering machine cases,
talk about fiction, shotgun assertions, free indirect discourse, imaginary contexts, and pretense. See e.g.
Predelli (1996), Predelli (1998) and Egan (2009) for discussion of the nature of context, shotgun assertions and
delayed assertions. See Predelli (2008) for a monstrous treatment of discourse about fiction and pretense.
38For a survey of various two-dimensional approaches to the Kripkean contingent apriori and necessary
aposteriori see Chalmers (2006).
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Knowledge is factive, so that if φ is known then φ, but moreover it seems that factivity
holds at all times. That is, it is always the case that if φ is known, then φ. Call this eternal
factivity:
eternal factivity:  G(Kφ→ φ)
While both principles seem plausible, along with common assumptions they entail the
absurd principle that if φ, then it will always be the case that φ. That is, φ → Gφ comes
out as valid. A quick derivation is as follows:
1. Np→ p [theorem]
2. GK(Np→ p) [1, logical omniscience]
3. G(K(Np→ p)→ (Np→ p)) [eternal factivity]
4. G(Np→ p) [2, 3, dist, mp]
5. p→ GNp [theorem]
6. p→ Gp [4, 5, dist, chain]
But of course we don’t want that result. The fact that it is raining certainly doesn’t entail
that it is always going to rain.
One way out of the puzzle is to reject eternal factivity. For indexical languages the
validities are the sentences that are true in every context. To say that the agent knows all
the validities, then is to say that if φ is true in every context then, the agent knows φ.
This motivates the idea that K should be interpreted as a quantifier over all the contexts
compatible with the information available to the agent.39 On this interpretation K is
monstrous.
Another way out of the puzzle is to deny the logical omniscience principle. Given that
Np→ p is valid, a perfectly rational agent should know it, thus K(Np→ p) ought to hold as
39That is, one could give K this sort of interpretation: JKφKw,t,t′ = 1 iff for all contexts c compatible with the
information available to the agent (in w relative to 〈t, t′〉), JφKwc ,tc ,tc = 1. This is to give up eternal factivity.
Assume it’s raining today (tc) but not at some other time t, then G(Nr→ r) is false – Nr is true at t (relative to tc)
but r is false at t (relative to tc). Yet, even at t, K(Nr→ r) is true since its the the diagonalised proposition that
is relevant to the K operator.
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well. But since G(Np → p) is false (let’s assume) we should expect GK(Np → p) to be false
as well. For example, assume it’s raining today but not tomorrow, then although “if its
raining now, it is raining” is valid (and known), it won’t be true tomorrow – so then why
think it will be known tomorrow?
The puzzle here is an instance of a more general puzzle. The nesting problem arises in
a multi-modal logic with operators for metaphysical necessity, , and epistemic necessity
(apriority), . Assuming  distributes, the following are inconsistent
(1) φ ∧ ¬φ
(2) φ→ φ
(3) (φ→ φ)
Thus, in light of the contingent priori we face a dilemma: Either (i) what is a priori is a
contingent matter or (ii) it is possible that something is a priori but false. Neither options
looks especially appealing.40
Further reading
• Israel, D. and Perry, J.: 1996, “Where monsters dwell”, in J. Seligman and D.
Westerståhl (eds), Logic, Language and Computation, Vol. 1, CSLI Publications, Stan-
ford.
• Rabern, B. and Ball, D.: 2019, “Monsters and the theoretical role of context”, Philoso-
phy and Phenomenological Research, 98(2), 392–416.
• Recanati, F.: 2010, “Indexicality and context-shift”, URL: https://jeannicod.ccsd.
cnrs.fr/ijn_00000552/document
• Anand, P. and Nevins, A.: 2004, “Shifty operators in changing contexts”, Proceedings
of SALT, Vol. 14, pp. 20?37.
• Santorio, P.: 2019, “Context-free semantics”, in E. LePore and D. Sosa (eds), Oxford
Studies in Philosophy of Language, Volume 1, Oxford University Press, pp. 208?239.
40See Dever (2007), Chalmers and Rabern (2014), and Fritz (2013).
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